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Abstract
When individuals' labor and capital income are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks,
should capital and labor be taxed, and if so how? In a two period general equilibrium model
with production, we derive a decomposition formula of the welfare eects of these taxes into
insurance and distribution eects. This allows us to determine how the sign of the optimal taxes
on capital and labor depend on the nature of the shocks, the degree of heterogeneity among
consumers' income as well as on the way in which the tax revenue is used to provide lump
sum transfers to consumers. When shocks aect primarily labor income and heterogeneity is
small, the optimal tax on capital is positive. However in other cases a negative tax on capital is
welfare improving. (JEL codes: D52, H21. Keywords: optimal linear taxes, incomplete markets,
constrained eciency)
1 Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the role and optimal form of taxation of investment
and labor income in a two period production economy with uninsurable background risk. More
precisely, we investigate whether the introduction of linear, distortionary taxes or subsidies on labor
income and/or on the returns from savings are welfare improving and what is then the optimal
sign of such taxes. This amounts to studying the Ramsey problem in a general equilibrium set-up.
We depart however from most of the literature on the subject1 for the fact that we consider an
environment with no public expenditure, where there is no need to raise tax revenue. Still, optimal
taxes are typically nonzero as we will show. The reason is that even distortionary taxes can improve
the allocation of risk in the face of incomplete markets. The issue then arises of which production
factor should be taxed, and which economic properties determine the signs of the optimal taxes.
A possible answer to this question may come from the following consequence of the agents' pre-
cautionary motive for saving: under uninsurable risk, this motive implies that savings and hence
capital accumulation will be higher compared to the situation where markets are complete. This
point was made in an inuential paper by Aiyagari (1995, p. 1160) and in fact various papers
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Gottardi acknowledges nancial supports from the EUI and Kajii from the Inamori Foundation and the Grant-in-Aid
for Scientic Research. Nakajima gratefully acknowledges nancial supports from the Murata Science Foundation,
and the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology.
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1thereafter suggested, implicitly and explicitly, that with incomplete markets, the precautionary sav-
ing motive leads to over-accumulation of capital and hence that a positive tax on capital is welfare
improving.2
We argue however that this implication is unwarranted: the comparison between the level of
capital accumulation with and without complete markets has no clear welfare implication. If there
were a policy tool which could implement the complete market allocation, there would be little doubt
for the policy maker to adopt such a policy as far as attaining eciency is concerned. However, since
a tax and subsidy scheme of the kind mentioned above will not allow to complete the markets, this
comparison tells little about the welfare eects of taxation, not to mention whether or not capital
should be taxed.
To properly assess whether or not positive taxes on capital are welfare improving when markets
are incomplete, one should rather compare the competitive equilibria with and without taxes, keeping
the other parts of the market structure, and in particular the set of available nancial assets, xed.
This \second best" exercise is what we do formally in this paper. We consider explicitly market
equilibria with taxation, for various tax-subsidy schemes. We say that capital should be taxed (resp.
subsidized) if there is an equilibrium with a positive (resp. negative) tax on capital where consumers'
welfare is higher than in an equilibrium without tax. The same applies for labor.
The reader may still wonder if the optimal capital tax should ever be negative in the sense above
when the equilibrium stock of capital is higher than when markets are complete. We show that
indeed subsidizing capital may be welfare improving in such a case. This nding does not rely on
the presence of upward sloping demand curves, so that subsidizing capital further increases its level
but nevertheless raises consumers' welfare. To give some intuition for this, let us rst describe the
model more explicitly to outline our results.
We consider a two period economy with production, where the savings of each consumer can be
invested to obtain capital, which is then used as input in the production process the next period. In
addition, the consumer has to choose how much to work in the second period, and the productivity
of his work is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. The amount of capital obtained per unit invested by
a consumer may also be subject to idiosyncratic shocks. This is all the uncertainty in the model,
idiosyncratic shocks are independent across consumers and there is a continuum of consumers so
that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Consumers may dier in terms of their initial income as well
as of their preferences. Capital and labor are exchanged between consumers and rms in competitive
markets. Since the consumers' investment is the only instrument allowing them to transfer income
over time, markets are clearly incomplete. Linear, uniform taxes on the wage income as well as
on the investment income may be introduced and the net revenue from these taxes is redistributed
to consumers via lump sum transfers. Such taxes and transfers aect individual savings and labor
supply decisions and thus induce a change in equilibrium prices, and of course in consumers' welfare.
With incomplete markets these price changes aect the risk allocation among agents, a pecuniary
externality which was rst noticed by Hart (1975) and Stiglitz (1982). In our setup, the pecuniary
externality consists of two eects. First, a price change has an insurance eect: if the price of a
risky factor of production goes down, the risk in the agent's future income is reduced, thus the
consequences of the missing markets are partially oset. Secondly, a price change also has an
indirect distribution eect as it does with complete markets: since agents are endowed dierently in
the factors of production, a change in the relative prices of factors will induce transfers of income
across dierent types of consumers. In addition, depending on the way in which the revenue of the
2See for instance, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004, Chapter 15, pp. 535-536), Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009,
pp. 167-8 ).
2tax is redistributed to consumers, there may be some direct distribution eect as well: for instance,
if the lump sum transfer is constant and common to every consumer, it will directly provide some
income smoothing across consumers.
Even in this relatively simple environment to determine the actual level of the optimal tax rates
is not an easy task. We shall therefore primarily focus our analysis on the eects of introducing taxes
at an innitesimal level at a competitive equilibrium with no taxes. The rst order eects of such
taxes can be obtained by dierentiating the equilibrium system, whenever the equilibrium with no
taxes is regular. We will decompose them into insurance and distribution eects and investigate their
properties. Building on this decomposition result, we are then able to identify sets of conditions
(concerning both the characteristics of the economy and of the tax schemes considered) under which
a welfare improvement can be obtained with a positive, or a negative, tax on capital, and similarly
for labor.
In Section 3, as a preliminary step, we consider a situation where consumers' savings or labor
supply can be directly modied, which we shall refer to as the constrained optimality exercise. This
problem was also investigated by Davila et al (2005) in a similar setup, but with an exogenous labor
supply and with idiosyncratic shocks only aecting labor productivity. We nd that the insurance
eect operates in favor of a decrease in consumers' investment, or alternatively of an increase in
labor supply, when the shocks aect primarily labor rather than capital (and vice versa in the
opposite case). With signicant heterogeneity in the pattern of consumers' initial income (and
possibly preferences), the distribution eect also becomes important. This eect has a dierent
sign across consumers: while the relatively poor consumers benet even more from a decrease in
the investment level, the relatively rich ones might actually loose from it. As a consequence, when
heterogeneity among the dierent types of consumers is large, a change (in investment or labor
supply) improving the utility of all types of consumers cannot be found. Therefore we investigate
which changes improve social welfare evaluated ex ante, `under the veil of ignorance', that is before
a type is assigned to any consumer. A redistribution among dierent types of consumers may then
be justied as a way to provide agents some insurance against `bad' realizations of their type.
We nd that the distribution eect works for ex ante welfare in the opposite direction as the
insurance eect. Hence, considering again the case where shocks primarily aect labor, if investment
is reduced ex ante welfare increases (and we then say there is over investment in equilibrium) when
the heterogeneity among consumers of dierent types is small, but it worsens when the heterogeneity
is large. Opposite conclusions hold for labor supply changes. We emphasize that these ndings are
independent of the level of the equilibrium interest rate and of the presence of a precautionary
motive. Therefore, to determine whether or not there is over investment in equilibrium, a primary
role is played by the degree of heterogeneity among consumers and by the nature of the shocks.
We turn then to the analysis of optimal taxes in Section 4. With taxes, savings and labor supply
can only be controlled indirectly and the welfare eects of taxes depend on the way they aect
savings and labor supply.
When the tax revenue is rebated to consumers without inducing any reallocation of income across
consumers or realization of the idiosyncratic shocks, the eects of taxes are analogous to those of
directly controlling investment or labor supply (Section 4.1). We then nd that the optimal tax on
capital is positive (and the optimal tax on labor negative) exactly when there is over investment
in the constrained optimality exercise. Therefore when the shocks aect primarily labor and the
degree of heterogeneity among consumers' income is suciently limited, capital should be taxed.
The reverse conclusion holds instead when the heterogeneity is large (or the shocks aect primarily
the returns on savings).
3In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we turn our attention to the case where the tax revenue is no longer redis-
tributed to each consumer exactly in proportion to the consumer's tax payments in each individual
state, so that the tax scheme also provides some insurance and/or some income redistribution among
consumers. In this situation the basic trade o is as follows: the provision of insurance strengthens
the case for a positive tax, especially for the factor whose income is more aected by the shocks. In
contrast, the provision of redistribution tends to strengthen the case for taxing capital and weakens
that for taxing labor, since it is typically the case that the main source of income is capital for
wealthy consumers and labor for poor consumers and transfers from rich to poor are benecial from
an ex ante perspective. Thus the sign of the optimal tax depends on both the sign and the relative
importance of these two eects.
We also consider (in Section 4.4) the case where lump sum transfers are not available, so that
the revenue of the tax on one factor is redistributed to consumers via a subsidy on the other factor.
Surprisingly enough, we obtain that it is optimal to tax capital whenever there is under investment
in equilibrium. This is exactly the opposite of what we found when lump sum transfers are possible,
without redistribution (in Section 4.1).
The analyses thus far are local, in the neighborhood of a competitive equilibrium with no taxes.
The characterization of the optimal level of the tax rates requires a global analysis of the equilibria
with taxes and it is then dicult to obtain general results for this. In Section 5 we consider a
numerical example of an economy exhibiting standard properties, for which the optimal tax rates
are derived for the dierent tax schemes considered. The numerical results also show that the
sign of the optimal tax rates are typically in accord with our ndings from the local analysis and
illustrate once again how the level of the optimal tax on capital and labor depends on the degree of
heterogeneity among consumers.
The two period framework of the analysis allows us to obtain a clear decomposition of the eects
of taxes in incomplete market economies and to determine their properties. In such environment,
however, we cannot address important issues such as the intertemporal allocation of the tax burden,
which has been one of the major issues in the literature, starting with Judd (1985) and Chamley
(1986) in a complete market setting and with Aiyagari (1995) when markets are incomplete. Still,
we claim that the ndings of our present analysis allows to gain some insights on the properties of
optimal taxes in dynamic, innite horizon economies. Building on this work in fact, in a companion
paper Gottardi, Kajii and Nakajima (2011) study the solutions of the dynamic Ramsey problem of
nding optimal public debt and linear taxes on capital and labor in an innite horizon model with
incomplete markets.
2 The Economy
We consider a two period competitive market economy as follows. The economic agents consist of
one representative rm and I types of consumers, with a continuum of consumers of size one for
each type.
The rm has a constant returns to scale technology described by a smooth homogeneous concave
production function F (K;L), where the output is the amount produced of the single consumption
good, per capita, K is the amount of capital input, also per capita, and L is the amount of labor
input per capita, both measured in eciency units (as made clearer in what follows). The rm
maximizes prots taking prices as given: writing r for the cost of capital per eciency unit and w
for the wage per eciency unit, K and L will be chosen so that FK (K;L) = r and FL (K;L) = w.
The rm operates in the second period, when both the production activity and the purchases of
4inputs take place, although other interpretations are possible.
Consumers of the same type are ex ante identical, i.e., have the same preferences and endowment
prole and make the same choices in the rst period. Each consumer of type i is endowed with ei > 0
units of consumption good in the rst period, which may be consumed or invested. If invested, it
will yield some amount of the capital good next period (which may also be interpreted as human
capital), to be sold to the rm at price r. Denote by ki the amount invested by type i, thus ei   ki
is the consumption in the rst period. In the second period, any type i consumer is endowed with
 Hi units of labor hour (  Hi > 0) which can be supplied in the market.
Each consumer is subject to idiosyncratic risk. For each i, denote by (i;Pi) the probability space
which describes the shock aecting type i consumers. We assume that the shock is independently
and identically distributed across the consumers of type i, and independently distributed across
dierent types.
The idiosyncratic shock aects both the return of the consumers' investment and the eciency






in eciency units of capital in the second period, where K
i is a random variable on the state space
(i;Pi). We further assume that the i.i.d. assumption of the shocks implies that the aggregate
supply of capital Ki from type i consumers in eciency units is equal to ki times the expected value





,3 that is Ki = iki. By




The level of the labor supply is chosen after i 2 i is realized: writing h
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i for the labor hours
supplied after the consumer observed i, the labor supply in eciency units L
i














every i. Again we assume that the aggregate supply of labor of type i consumers in eciency units,
Li, is equal to the expected level of the labor supply. That is, if we write Li for the total supply of






holds, and then by denition the









. In the special case of inelastically
supplied labor, h
i
i =  Hi at every i. In such a case, L
i
i = L
i (i)  Hi, and Li =  Hi.
The structure of the uncertainty thus allows both for idiosyncratic labor income risk, as in
Aiyagari (1994), and idiosyncratic capital income risk, as in Angeletos (2007). Allowing for both
capital and labor risks generates some symmetry and allows us to identify the role played by each
type of risk in the comparative statics and welfare analysis. The special case where there is no shock
to capital income, i.e. K
i is constant and only labor eciency is subject to idiosyncratic shocks,
constitutes an important benchmark and we will refer to it as the benchmark case. It will be the
main focus of the parts of the analysis where the sign of the optimal tax rates are determined.
To ensure that the model is well dened, we assume throughout our analysis that both the
individual labor endowment and the gross return on savings are always positive: that is, K
i (i) > 0
and L
i (i) > 0 occur with probability one. To preserve the uninsurable nature of the consumers'















 0 for any pair of states i and 0
i. That is, if the labor
3Since the shocks are independent, the meaning of the expectation will be clear and so we shall omit the reference
to the underlying measure Pi.
5endowment of a type i household is relatively large, the productivity of capital tends to be high as
well. We shall therefore use the convention that the household is (relatively) rich at state i if the
corresponding L
i (i) is (relatively) large. Notice that this assumption holds automatically in the
benchmark case.
A type i consumer's risk preferences are represented by a time additively separable utility func-
tion: the rst period utility is given by a function vi of the rst period consumption of the good, and
the second period utility is given by a function ui of the consumption of the good and leisure. So
when a type i individual chooses to invest ki and supply L
i
i = L
i (i)  Hi eciency units of labor at




i units of the good and
 Hi   h
i
i units of leisure in the second period in state i, where K
i
i = K
i (i)ki. Thus his choice


























i are dened and understood as functions of ki and h
i
i as in (1) and (2). We
assume that both vi and ui are smooth and concave, strictly increasing in the consumption good
and non-decreasing in leisure. We also assume that the random variables are well behaved so that
the rst order approach is valid: i.e., we assume that the following rst order condition completely
characterizes the solution to the consumer's choice problem:
 v0





































= 0, at every i; (5)
where uic and uil stand for the partial derivatives with respect to consumption and leisure, respec-
tively. This assumption is satised, for instance, if each state space is nite. Similar convention will
be used throughout the paper, e.g., uicc stands for the second derivative with respect to consump-
tion, and uicl stands for the cross derivative. Furthermore, for the special case where uil is always
equal to zero, labor is inelastically supplied and condition (5) is replaced with
L
i (i)  Hi   L
i
i = 0 at every i: (6)
Note that, since all individuals of the same type solve the same problem and such problem is convex,
their optimal decisions are also the same.
It can be readily veried that the consumption good markets clear when all the factor markets
clear. So in this economy a competitive equilibrium occurs when the rm's prot maximization
condition is satised at a level of the aggregate input variables that is equal to the one derived from
the consumers' maximization problems. Formally,
Denition 1 A collection
 























is a solution to (3), and the prot maximization conditions, FK
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^ K; ^ L

= ^ w, hold for ^ K = 1
I
PI

















for every type i consumer are a function of
the realization of i, so are the capital in eciency units, the second period consumption, and the
labor supply in eciency units. Let, in particular, ^ c
i
i := ^ w^ L
i




i :=  Hi   h
i
i : The
comparative statics properties of the equilibrium and the sign of the optimal taxes depend on how
6these variables vary with respect to i, i = 1;::;I. We show in what follows that in 'normal cases',
that include the situation where consumption and leisure are normal goods and distributions of the
shocks as in the benchmark case, the following property holds.
Denition 2 A competitive equilibrium
 












is said to exhibit a standard









is decreasing in L



























i is non-decreasing and ^ L
i
i is increasing in L
i (i).
Regarding condition i), intuitively speaking, a high realization of L
i (i) implies that the con-
sumer is rich ex post, and so consumption should be relatively high and hence the marginal utility
from consumption relatively low. Also, the amount of labor in eciency units should be relatively
high. The following result can then be proved by applying usual consumer theory (a proof is provided
for completeness in the Appendix).
Lemma 1 Assume that ui is strictly concave (uiccuill   (uicl)2 > 0 everywhere) and consump-
tion is a normal good (uiccuil   uicluic < 0 everywhere). Then in any competitive equilibrium  












, condition i) of Denition 2 holds.





i is obviously increasing in L
i (i)
when ui is constant in leisure (and hence the supply of labor hours is inelastic). But when ui
is increasing in leisure, it is not clear-cut whether or not ^ L
i
i is still increasing in L
i (i): a higher
L
i (i) means a higher eective wage which induces more labor, but it also generates a higher income
from capital which induces more leisure. So ^ L
i
i should be increasing, roughly speaking, when the
income eect from the higher revenue from the capital investment is not excessively large. A formal
sucient condition is stated in the following (also proved in the Appendix):
Lemma 2 Assume that K
i (i) is constant, and that ui is strictly concave and leisure is a normal
good (uilluic uicluil < 0 everywhere). Then in any competitive equilibrium
 













condition ii) of Denition 2 holds.
An alternative sucient condition is the case of inelastic labor hour supply. Indeed in such case
condition ii) is obviously satised, and i) holds since uicc is negative and independent of l
i
i .4
In the following analysis, when we determine the sign of the comparative statics eects we shall
focus our attention on equilibria which are standard to shocks.
3 Constrained ineciency of competitive equilibria
3.1 Feasible policies and allocations
As we discussed in the Introduction, it is important to specify the set of instruments available to
a social planner to provide an economically meaningful denition of over or under investment. In
this section, we shall consider instruments consisting in the direct control of capital and labor. The
4Davila et al. (2005) consider the case where labor supply is inelastic and K
i (i) is constant, thus an equilibrium
in their set up is automatically standard to shocks.
7use of such instruments is clearly very demanding for a policy maker, and so they do not constitute
policy tools of practical value. But the analysis of such case will provide some quite useful insights,
and be instrumental for the subsequent analysis of the case where the policy tools are only given by
linear, anonymous taxes on labor and capital.
More specically, suppose the social planner can directly control the amounts of investment, ki,
as well as of labor hours, h
i
i ; for all consumers in every state i. That is, the policy instruments











. All the other, non-policy
variables are determined in competitive markets. Specically, since the planner cannot control the
rm's decisions, the prices r and w are endogenously determined in equilibrium in such a way that
the rm's demand for inputs equal the aggregate supply of inputs set by the planner: r = FK (K;L)










, K = 1
I
PI
i=1 iki. We shall write r(K;L) and
w(K;L) to indicate these maps associating the market clearing prices to the aggregate quantities,
K and L.
The levels of consumption of each type i consumer in the two periods and his leisure in the second







chosen by the planner and the associated
market clearing prices. Specically, rst period consumption for type i is c0
i = ei   ki while in
the second period in state i his leisure is l
i
i =  Hi   h
i







i . So the feasibility of a policy is naturally dened as follows:











is said to be feasible if for every i, we have ei ki  0,
 Hi  h
i




i  0 at every i, where r(K;L) and w(K;L) are the
market clearing prices for K = 1
I
PI








































































where K = 1
I
PI










. Following the common idea of second best
analysis, we can present then a constrained eciency notion5:









is said to be constrained inecient if there




































for every type i, strictly for some i, where Ui is dened as in (7).
We can similarly give a precise denition of over investment as characterizing situations where
there exists a Pareto improving feasible policy such that
P
i ~ ki <
P
i ki (and symmetrically for under
investment).
5An equivalent notion could be stated for allocations instead of policies after dening a constrained feasible allo-
cation as a consumption-leisure allocation achievable with a feasible policy.
8Note that, even though the planner can directly choose the level of individual investments and
labor hours, the set of allocations attainable with feasible policies is still smaller than the set of
feasible allocations considered in the standard Pareto eciency notion. The planner is in fact
still constrained by the requirement that the agents' second period consumption respects the budget
constraint c
i
i = rK (i)ki+wL (i)h
i
i for every i and i, with prices r and w set at the competitive
equilibrium level. Thus insurance against the consumers' idiosyncratic shocks can only be provided
by using the existing markets and the consumers' investment and labor choices. Hence although a
competitive equilibrium allocation is typically Pareto inecient in the environment considered, it
might still be constrained ecient in principle.
3.2 First Order eects and constrained ineciency
From now on, x a competitive equilibrium
 












which is standard to shocks.











is constrained ecient. If it is
not, we want to see what kind of policies improve upon it and in particular whether or not there is
over investment.
For this purpose, we shall study how the functions Ui behave around the equilibrium values, by























has two eects on the expected utility level of a type i consumer given








second is an indirect eect due to the change in the values of the equilibrium prices r and w. At a
competitive equilibrium, however, the direct eect has no rst order eect on welfare by the envelope







already maximize the utility of consumer i at
the prices ( ^ w; ^ r). Therefore, the only rst order welfare eect of the policy change is the indirect
eect, that is, only the pecuniary externality of the change in prices.
For this reason, as long as we are concerned with the derivative evaluated at an equilibrium






















as xed constants. Let us calculate then its derivatives at the equilibrium values
( ^ K; ^ L). Since the rst period utility vi does not depend on (K;L), we only need to dierentiate
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where uic is evaluated at the equilibrium levels of leisure and consumption in the second period,
respectively  Hi   ^ h
i
i and ^ w^ L
i
i + ^ r ^ K
i
i , and @w
@K and @r
@K are both evaluated at

^ K; ^ L

. A similar
9convention will be used throughout the paper. By denition, there is over investment in equilibrium
if @Ui
@K < 0 for every i at

^ K; ^ L

.
















i + r(K;L) ^ K
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There is under supply of labor in equilibrium if @Ui
@L > 0 for every i at

^ K; ^ L

.
Expressions (8) and (9) can be re-written in a more informative way as follows. Recall that
FK (K;L) = r(K;L) and FL (K;L) = w(K;L). Hence @r
@K = FKK < 0 and @w
@K = FKL > 0.






 L = 0: (10)
Similarly, we have @r
@L = FKL > 0 and @w






 L = 0: (11)
Coming back to the welfare change, taking (10) into account, we can decompose the marginal
































































where all the variables are evaluated at the equilibrium.














i   ^ Li
i
describe the re-
lationship between the agent's marginal utility and the idiosyncratic shocks. In what follows, we


















i   ^ Li
i
; (14)
where I stands for \insurance". The reason is that these terms capture the component of the welfare
eect of the change in prices that depends on how individual risks aect the agent's consumption
and leisure choices, that is on the extent by which such risks are insured. When such shocks are
fully insured these terms are in fact zero.
Lemma 3 At an equilibrium which is standard to shocks, IK
i  0 and IL
i < 0, i.e. the insurance
eects dened in (13) and (14) are negative.
Proof. By the denition of the standard response to shocks, uic and ^ K
i
i ; ^ L
i
i move in the opposite
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< 0.
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i   ^ Li
i
< 0 hold.
The fact that IK
i  0 and IL
i < 0 for every i tells us that the insurance eect associated to
either a decrease in r or in w is a unanimous increase in individual welfare. To gain some economic
intuition for this, notice that labor and capital constitute two alternative, `risky' ways to provide
wealth for future consumption. An increase in the market price of labor or of capital thus increases
such risk and is so detrimental, the more so the riskier the instrument is.
A change in K, however, has the opposite eect on factor prices w and r. Hence the insurance
eect of, say, an increase in K is given by the rst and the third term in (12), which have respectively
a positive and a negative sign, since @r
@K < 0 and @w
@K > 0. To determine which one prevails, notice





i , appearing in it, that is the less volatile is the return from the instrument considered to
transfer wealth to the future. In particular, if K
i is a constant (i.e., there is no shock to capital
accumulation as in the benchmark case) then IK
i = 0, the insurance eect from the investment
choice is zero. Consequently, since @w
@K > 0, a marginal increase in aggregate investment will reduce
the induced utility of every household. So as far as the insurance eect is concerned, the households
unanimously prefer a reduction of capital.
The remaining terms in (12), E[uic]





^ Li   ^ L

; describe the relationship
between the (expected) marginal utility of type i and the deviation of his average supply of capital











^ Li   ^ L

; (16)
where D stands for \distribution". They capture the eect of the price change on type i's utility
that is due to the relative size of his trades in the market with respect to those of the whole economy,
that is to the `relative position' of type i in the market. Evidently, when the economy consists of ex
ante homogeneous types, these terms will be zero, hence their magnitude depends on the degree of
heterogeneity among consumers in the economy at the equilibrium.
Summing up, we have the following decomposition result:
Proposition 4 The rst order eect on the welfare of type i consumers at a competitive equilibrium







































where all terms are evaluated at the equilibrium values.
Proof. The expression of the derivative with respect to a change in K is obtained from (12) by
substituting @r
@K and @w
@K with FKK and FKL and using (13) - (16). The next expression, for the
change in L, is analogously obtained, adding (11) to (9), collecting terms as in (12), using then (13)
- (16) and replacing @r
@L and @w
@L with FLK and FLL.
11Remark 1 The terms IK
i ; DK
i , and IL
i ; DL
i describe the marginal eects on consumers' utility of a
unit change in prices, respectively r, w, at the equilibrium under consideration. The total marginal
eect will be the sum of these terms multiplied by the marginal change in prices. In the present
section, the marginal change in prices is induced by the direct control of K and L, and hence is
given by the second derivatives of the production function F as we have seen in the decomposition
result above. In the next sections various other policy tools are considered, leading to dierent forms
for the marginal changes in prices. However, because of this common structure, the expression




i , and DL
i appear with dierent terms describing the price change multiplying them.
Proposition 4 shows that the rst order eect on agents' welfare of a change in the aggregate
supply of capital or labor consists of the weighted sum of the insurance and the distribution eects.
The only dierence between the eect of a change in capital and labor lies in the value of these
weights, which are the derivatives of the production function. This point is better appreciated if we























































This decomposition result oers some clear insights on the relevant welfare eects. We give a
few simple but interesting corollaries here. First of all, we observe that those consumers who favor
a decrease in the stock of capital are exactly those who favor an increase in the amount of labor:
Corollary 5 For any type i, @Ui
@K  0 if and only if @Ui
@L  0.
Proof. Compare (17) and (18): both FKK and FLL are negative by assumption, and the terms
multiplying them are identical but with opposite sign.
Secondly, when the (absolute) magnitude of the distribution eects is bigger than that of the
insurance eects, a reduction of the stock of capital benets those types who invest more and work
























@K > 0 if ^ Ki   ^ K < 0 and ^ Li   ^ L > 0.
Proof. Note rst that ^ Ki   ^ K > 0 and ^ Li   ^ L < 0 imply that DK
i > 0 and DL
i < 0. Hence by
Proposition 4 @Ui










; since FKK < 0 and FKL > 0. The second claim
is established by a symmetric argument: when ^ Ki   ^ K < 0 and ^ Li   ^ L > 0 we have DK
i < 0 and
DL
i > 0 and hence @Ui











Finally, we show that, in the benchmark case, when consumers are all of the same type (I = 1),
at an equilibrium that is standard to shocks we always have over investment and under supply of
labor.7 In the absence of ex ante heterogeneity among consumers the distribution eects, whose
signs are in general ambiguous, are zero. Although we do not establish it formally here, the result
can be readily extended to economies where I > 1 but the ex ante heterogeneity across types is
suciently small.
6This condition is always satised when there is no shock to the productivity of the investment, in which case
IK
i = 0.
7This claim generalizes a result in Davila et al. (2005), who only consider the case of inelastically supplied labor.
12Corollary 7 Assume that I = 1 and K
i (i) = i for all i 2 i. Then at an equilibrium which is
standard to shocks, a reduction of the stock of capital (if ^ K > 0) and/or an increase in the amount
of labor (if ^ L <  Hi) improve consumers' utility. Thus an equilibrium which is standard to shocks is
constrained inecient and exhibits over investment.
Proof. When I = 1, ^ Ki = ^ K and ^ Li = ^ L by construction, and so DK
i = DL
i = 0. Also K
i (i) = i
for all i implies that the insurance eect for capital vanishes as well: i.e., IK
i = 0. So by Proposition
4, @Ui
@K = IL
i FKL. This is negative since FKL > 0 by the assumed properties of the technology and
IL
i < 0 by Lemma 3. Similarly for labor, assuming an interior solution, Proposition 4 shows that
@Ui
@L = IL
i FLL > 0.
Remark 2 We have thus established that, in economies where consumers are ex ante identical,
there is over investment in equilibrium when the idiosyncratic shocks only aect the productivity of
labor. Even though this nding may appear in line with the one by Aiyagari (1995) the notion of
over investment used here is quite dierent. Moreover the logic behind it is also dierent. To see
this, notice that the result holds irrespectively of whether a precautionary motive is present or not,
and in fact the level of the equilibrium interest rate plays no role in the above arguments. What is
crucial is, on the other hand, the structure of the shocks: the result is completely overturned when
the idiosyncratic shocks only aect the productivity of capital.
3.3 Social constrained optimality
The analysis in the previous section shows that, in the absence of ex ante heterogeneity among
consumers, in the benchmark case (standard) competitive equilibria are constrained inecient and
exhibit over investment. When consumers are suciently heterogeneous on the other hand, we do
not know whether a Pareto improvement can still be found only by modifying K. This is because for
some type i consumer the distribution eect may have the opposite sign and overturn the insurance
eect, so that @Ui
@K > 0. If we consider a change both in K and L, a welfare improvement exists if we
can nd weights K and L,
 
K;L
6= 0, such that the terms K @Ui
@K + L @Ui
@L  0 have the same
sign for every i. Notice however that when I > 2 even this condition is not easily met. Indeed, we
will see in our numerical example that the equilibrium may in fact be constrained ecient.
Remark 3 This is altogether in accord with the general constrained ineciency result of Citanna
- Kajii - Villanacci (1998): they show that with incomplete markets competitive equilibria can be
Pareto improved (in terms of rst order eects) if the planner has at least as many policy tools as
the number of households plus one. In our framework, the number of policy tools which can have
rst order eects is eectively two, K and L, whatever the number of households. So their analysis
can be compared to ours only when I = 1, in which case we have indeed established constrained
ineciency (even with only one policy tool).
The above discussion reveals the diculty of obtaining welfare improvements in the present
framework when agents are ex ante heterogenous. In what follows we shall consider the possibility
of obtaining improvements when allocations are evaluated \under the veil of ignorance", that is
before the type of an agent is determined. The expected utility of an arbitrary consumer, who can




























. Some further justication for evaluating welfare in this way
13comes from the view of the two period economy as a section of a dynamic economy where types are
the result of past realizations of idiosyncratic shocks and individual decisions.












by changing K or L as the constrained optimality problem, whereas constrained eciency, as dened
in the previous section, refers to the maximization of the vector of the utility functions of each
individual type.
The derivative of the social welfare function W; evaluated at a competitive equilibrium, is simply
the weighted sum of the derivatives of the individual utility functions found in Proposition 4 as well





































































































Denition 5 A competitive equilibrium exhibits over investment (from a social welfare perspec-
tive) if @W
@K < 0, and under investment if @W
@K > 0. Similarly, there is under supply of labor if
@W
@L > 0 and over supply of labor if @W
@L < 0:











i may still be signed. To see this, think of assigning a type i to
an agent at random; ^ Ki, ^ Li and E[uic] can thus be regarded as random variables over states










^ Li   ^ L



















by construction. We should expect
that at a competitive equilibrium the relatively \rich" types of households, whose consumption level
tends to be higher than the economy average, also tend to invest more than the average and work
less than the average.8 This property relies on some normality of consumers' demands and so we
shall use again the term 'standard' to refer to it:
Denition 6 A competitive equilibrium is said be standard in distribution if E[uic] is negatively
correlated with ^ Ki and positively correlated with ^ Li.
When the equilibrium is standard both to shocks and in distribution, we simply call it a standard
equilibrium. An immediate implication of the above property is as follows:
Lemma 8 If I > 1, in an equilibrium standard in distribution the average distribution eect of a












Hence at an equilibrium that is standard in distribution, the average distribution eect of an
increase in K has a positive sign in (19). On the other hand, in the benchmark case the average
8This property holds for instance in the example we discuss later.
14insurance eect has a negative sign in (19) since IL
i FKL < 0 for all i by Lemma 3. Thus there
is a clear trade-o: whether there is under or over investment from a social welfare perspective
depends on whether or not the average distribution eect prevails over the average insurance eect.
Intuitively, the distribution eect gets magnied as the heterogeneity of income across types of
households increases, whereas the insurance eect has no direct link to this heterogeneity. So we
can expect that there is under investment in terms of ex ante welfare in an equilibrium with large
income disparity, and indeed we will see this in numerical examples. We summarize this observation
below:
Proposition 9 Assume that K
i (i) = i for all i 2 i. A standard equilibrium exhibits under



























Proof. The fact that the productivity of the investment is not subject to idiosyncratic shocks implies
that IK
i = 0 for every i. Using (19), we obtain that @W





















L < 0 by Lemma 3 and
P
i DK
i < 0 and
P
i DL
i > 0 by Lemma 8, under the assumed
properties of the equilibrium, the claim follows.
Remark 4 This result together with Corollary 7 show that, to determine whether or not there is over
investment at an equilibrium, we should primarily look at the distribution of wealth across households.
At an equilibrium where the income disparity is large enough, and hence the distribution eect is also
large, we should expect that subsidizing capital is welfare improving. As already noticed in Remark
2, one can then deduce little concerning the direction of desirable policies from the observation that
the level of the equilibrium interest rate is lower than with complete markets, that is if agents were
able to trade in a complete set of contingent markets at the initial date.
Remark 5 Notice that our local characterization results go through even when there are no shocks
at all, so that markets are complete. In this special case, competitive equilibria are Pareto ecient
and so a change in capital or labor will result in an eciency loss. Ex ante welfare can be improved
nonetheless, since redistribution from relatively rich to relatively poor types provides consumers with
some insurance against `bad' realizations of their type. So another interpretation of our results is
that they clarify the nature of the trade-o between the eciency properties of equilibrium allocations
and the welfare properties arising from the inequality in income distribution.
4 Optimal Taxation
We analyzed so far whether agents' welfare at a competitive equilibrium might be improved by
suitably reducing/increasing the aggregate level of capital and labor when the available policy tools
consist in the direct control of the levels of individual investment and labor supply. We turn now our
attention to the case where such variables can only be indirectly controlled via anonymous, linear
taxes on labor and capital. The net revenue of such taxes is then redistributed to consumers via
lump sum taxes or transfers. In this case, consumers choose optimally the level of their investment
and labor supply, while the rm still chooses the level of its inputs so as to maximize prots and
prices r and w are set at a level such that markets clear.
Various scenarios can be considered concerning the specic denition of the taxes and subsidies.
We shall study a few cases, which will clarify the essence of the optimal taxation problem in our
context and its relationship with the decomposition found in Proposition 4.
15Throughout this section, we shall x a competitive equilibrium
 













and study the rst order eects of introducing a tax and subsidy scheme. In particular, we shall
investigate whether capital and/or labor should be taxed from the point of view of social welfare.
4.1 Taxes on returns
We rst look at the following tax/subsidy scheme. Denote by K the tax rate on the revenue from
the investment in capital, and L the tax rate on labor income. When consumer i invests ki and
chooses h
i




i of his revenue next period in state i must
be paid in taxes. The consumer also receives a lump sum transfer Ti (i) in state i. The choice















i + r(1   K)K
i









i are still as dened in (1) and (2). The maximization problem (21) remains a
concave problem, and so the following rst order conditions characterize its solutions:
 v0
i (ei   ki) + E

uic  K
i (i)r(1   K)

= 0: (22)
uic  w(1   L)L
i (i)   uil = 0, at every i; (23)




i + r(1   K)K
i






In order to isolate the pure substitution eect of the tax, we shall consider rst a tax-subsidy
scheme which does not induce any redistribution of income across dierent types of agents nor even
across realizations of the idiosyncratic state i. That is, the tax subsidy scheme must satisfy the





i = Ti (i); (24)
for every i. In other words, whatever an agent pays in taxes in any state i he also gets back as a lump
sum transfer in that same state. The implementation of this tax scheme is clearly informationally
rather demanding since it requires knowledge of individual trades and of the realization i of the
idiosyncratic shocks, which may be private information of the agent. This scheme is thus not
very realistic, but it allows to isolate the pure substitution eect of the tax and provides a useful
theoretical benchmark for the subsequent analyses.





















is a solution to (21), ii)













, and iii) the budget balance (24) holds, for each i;i.
An ex ante optimal tax scheme (K;L)9 is such that consumers' ex ante welfare is maximized


























i + r(1   K)K
i





9The level of the lump sum transfers Ti(:) is then uniquely determined by the budget balance condition (24).
10The expression below should be multiplied by the constant 1=I. Since this clearly plays no role in the analysis it
is then omitted, both here and in what follows.
16subject to the equilibrium conditions (22), (23), (24), conditions (1) and (2) dening K
i and L
i;





























In what follows we shall denote this term as W (K;L), to highlight the dependence of social welfare
on the parameters describing the tax policy.
By construction, a competitive equilibrium is an equilibrium with taxes, where K = L = 0,
and Ti ()  0 for every i. We intend to examine in particular whether W (K;L) is increasing in
K and/or L at K = L = 0. This will allow us to conclude that at least locally a positive tax
on the realized return on capital/labor is welfare improving. To this end we assume the variables
at an equilibrium with taxes are smooth functions of (K;L) around (K;L) = 0.11 Hence, dif-
ferentiating W (K;L) and evaluating it at K = L = 0 we shall say that capital should be taxed
if @
@K W (K;L) > 0 and it should be subsidized if @
@K W (K;L) < 0: A similar analysis can be
done for labor.
Note that the envelope property from the individual optimization applies here again. Also note
that the prot maximization condition must hold at any choice of tax rates, hence the Euler equation












 L = 0: (27)
We obtain a decomposition result for the eects of the introduction of the taxes which resembles
our ndings in Proposition 4 and equation (19), except that the changes in equilibrium prices are
induced by a change in K and L, not by a direct change of K and L:
Proposition 10 The (rst order) welfare eects of the introduction of taxes with no redistribution




































































































where the terms IK
i ; IL
i ; DK
i , and DL
i are still as in (13), (14), (15), and (16).
Proof. Since individual income in every state is not aected by the tax scheme, by the envelope
property the only rst order eect of the scheme on consumers' utility is given by the change in






i and ki can be treated as constants and w;r as - dierentiable
11This will be generically the case at least if the underlying state space is nite. The number of equilibrium variables
exceeds in fact the number of equations dening an equilibrium by two.
17by assumption - functions of (K;L). So we can do exactly the same operations as we did for the








@K , and @w
@L, respectively.
This result shows that the welfare eects of taxation can be decomposed into the insurance and
the distribution eects, whose properties have already been discussed in the previous section. But
in order to determine the sign of the welfare eects in (28) and (29) we need to identify the signs
of the changes in equilibrium prices. In general, prices could move in any direction, depending on
the signs of the derivatives of the excess demand functions for capital and labor. We shall assume
so that prices change in the natural direction: at the margin, an increase in the tax on the revenue
from the sale of an input increases the gross revenue (i.e., cum tax) of the input but reduces the net






































We shall refer to (30) and (31) as the natural signs for the changes in equilibrium factor prices.
We obtain a corollary similar to Corollary 5, which says whenever it is good to tax capital, it
should be good to subsidize labor as well.
Corollary 11 Assume the natural signs as above. Then taxing capital and taxing labor has opposite
eects on welfare: @W
@K  0 if and only if @W
@L  0.
We can thus focus our attention on identifying the conditions under which capital should be
taxed. The next result is an analogue of Proposition 9:
Proposition 12 Assume the natural signs (30) and (31). Then capital should be taxed at a standard
competitive equilibrium with taxes and no insurance nor redistribution if and only if there is over
investment. Suppose, in addition, that K
i (i) = i for all i 2 i and the competitive equilibrium is

























 and subsidized if the reverse
inequality holds; when I = 1, capital should always be taxed.
Proof. Under (30), @r=@K has always the opposite sign of @r=@K. Hence the same is true for the
expression for @W
@K in (28) and that for @W
@K in (19), which establishes the rst claim. Given this, the
following claims are an immediate corollary of Proposition 9 and Corollary 7.
Remark 6 Proposition 12 says that the idea of taxing an over used input is correct. And, as noticed
in Remark 4, the determination of whether a positive tax is benecial or not depends primarily on
the comparison between insurance and distribution eects, not on the level of the equilibrium price
of an input.
4.2 Lump-sum rebate as insurance
We consider next the case where there is still a linear tax on labor and capital income but the





each state i 2 i. By the i.i.d. assumption, the total, per capita tax paid by type i consumers
is a deterministic amount, equal to wLLi + rKKi, hence budget balance is still ensured with a
deterministic lump sum rebate Ti satisfying:
wLLi + rKKi = Ti; (32)
18for every i. The rebate has in this case an insurance eect, as the dierence between the tax
paid and the rebate received is positive whenever the return on capital and labor exceeds its mean
and negative otherwise. Although consumers' types need to be observable for this scheme, the
informational requirement is less demanding than in the previous case since the rebate is determined
independently of the realization i of the individual shock.















i + r(1   K)K
i





and an equilibrium with taxes and insurance but no redistribution can be dened, analogously to
Denition 7, by suitably replacing the expression of the consumers' objective function in (21) with
the one above and the budget balance condition (24) with (32). By proceeding in the same way
as in the previous section, we nd that the expression of ex ante welfare constituting the objective
































and shall similarly denote it as WI (K;L), where the superscript I highlights the new, insurance
component.
Assume again the competitive equilibrium we are considering is a regular equilibrium in (K;L),
so that the equilibrium variables are smooth functions of (K;L) around (K;L) = (0;0). We shall
use again the superscript I - e.g. rI (K;L), wI (K;L) - to indicate that these functions are
dierent from before as the equilibrium system is dierent. Dierentiating WI (K;L) with respect



















































































Comparing these expressions with the ones obtained in the previous section, (28) and (29), we
see that there is an additional term in each of them. This is due to the fact that the expression















. The derivative of this additional term with respect to
prices, when evaluated at L = K = 0, is zero - hence this term does not contribute to the price












respectively. Hence the direct eects on agents' utility of a change in taxes, at the margin, do






i   ^ Li
i






i   ^ Ki
i
^ r; which are
nothing but the insurance eects, IL
i and IK




i are both negative by Lemma 3, we conclude that the additional term in both
(34) and (35) is positive. Hence the claim in Corollary 11 is not valid in the present situation and
it is possible that both the optimal tax on capital and that on labor are positive.
Somewhat in contrast to Proposition 12 we nd that, under the same conditions, in the bench-
mark case the optimal tax on labor is always positive when tax rebates have an insurance role. On
the other hand, the properties of the sign of the optimal tax on capital are unchanged.
19Proposition 13 Assume the natural signs12 (30), (31), and that K
i (i) = i for all i 2 i.
At a standard competitive equilibrium with taxes and insurance but no redistribution, labor should



























; and subsidized otherwise. If I = 1, capital should always be taxed.
Proof. No productivity shock for capital implies IK
i = 0 for every i. At a standard equilibrium,







i > 0, while by Lemma 3 the insurance eect IL
i is negative for all i. The natural sign
assumption means then ^ w > @w
I
@L > 0 and so also @r
I
@L < 0 by the prot maximization conditions
r = FK, w = FL. Hence all the three terms in (35) are positive, which establishes the rst claim.
Comparing (34) with (28), we see they dier only for the term multiplying IK
i . Since by assump-
tion IK
i = 0 for all i, the derivative with respect to K has the same form at an equilibrium without
and with insurance. So the result follows from Proposition 12.
Remark 7 One might wonder why labor should be taxed even when there is (ex ante) under supply


























there is ex ante over investment and hence also, by Corollary 5, under supply of labor. But under
(32) the lump sum tax rebate provides insurance against private idiosyncratic risks. In the benchmark
case, where K
i (i) = i for all i, this insurance kicks in only if labor is taxed since the idiosyncratic
shocks only aect labor productivity. The result in Proposition 13 shows that, under the natural sign
assumption, the benets from such direct insurance exceeds the welfare loss from further discouraging
already under supplied labor.
4.3 Lump-sum rebate as insurance and redistribution
Next, we shall consider the case where the lump sum rebate is not only deterministic but also the
same for all types. Then the per capita rebate equals the average tax payment across types:
wLL + rKK = T: (36)
In this case the rebate has not only an insurance role, with respect to the individual shocks, but
also a role of redistributing wealth across dierent types. Notice that this scheme requires no knowl-
edge of the realizations of the individual shocks nor of individual types, and hence it is completely
anonymous.
An equilibrium with taxes and insurance as well as redistribution is then similarly dened, by
suitably replacing Ti(i) with T in (21) and the budget balance condition (24) with (36). The






































+ (Ki   K)
io
; (38)
and will be denoted by WIR (L;K) where R marks the new, redistribution element of the tax
scheme.
Assuming again that the equilibrium variables are smooth functions of (L;K) at (0;0),13 we
12Strictly speaking, the natural sign assumption in the present framework should be stated by replacing @r
@K and
@w
@L in (30) and (31) with @rI
@K and @wI
@L to reect the fact that the equilibrum price maps are dierent. With a slight
abuse of language we avoid to make this explicit, here and in what follows.
13Equilibrium price maps are similarly denoted as wIR(L;K), rIR(L;K):
20study under what conditions WIR (L;K) is increasing in K and/or L at K = L = 0, to
conclude that a positive tax on the realized return on capital and/or on labor is welfare improving.













































































































@L   ^ w
o



































They only dier from the corresponding terms in the previous section, (34) and (35), for the presence
of an additional term in each of them, respectively  
P
i fE[uic](Ki   K)g ^ r and  
P
i fE[uic](Li   L)g ^ w.
This is due to the fact that the expression for c
i
i in (38) also has two additional terms,  wL (Li   L) 
rK (Ki   K); which describe the redistributive component of the tax rebate. Dierentiating them
with respect to taxes and evaluating the eect on agents' utility yields14  ^ rE[uic](Ki   K) and
  ^ wE[uic](Li   L), which are equal to  ^ rDK
i and   ^ wDL
i . Using Lemma 8 we can then say that
the average of these terms, constituting the new terms in (34) and (35), has respectively a positive
and a negative sign. That is, the new redistributive eect of the tax scheme strengthens the case
for taxing capital and weakens that for taxing labor.
Proposition 14 Assume the natural signs (30), (31) and that K
i (i) = i for all i 2 i. At a
standard competitive equilibrium with taxes and insurance as well as redistribution, both capital and








 , i.e., the total distribution eect of labor is smaller than
the total insurance eect of labor. Moreover, capital should be taxed if there is over investment.
Proof. Under the stated assumptions, for the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 13,
we have again IK
i = 0 and IL
i < 0 for every i, and
P
i DK
i < 0 and
P
i DL
i > 0. Since the
natural signs assumption implies (@r
IR
@K   ^ r) < 0 and @w
IR



























: Moreover, since the natural signs assumption
also implies (@w
IR
@L   ^ w) < 0 and @r
IR
















Compare the condition, obtained from (39), for the positivity of the optimal tax on capital in
the present framework, with the one for over investment we get from (19). Since both FKK > 0 and
@r
IR
@K > 0 we see the rst condition is now weaker, thus the optimal tax on capital is always positive
when there is over investment (e.g., when I = 1). The optimal tax on capital may also be positive
when there is under investment (in contrast with Propositions 12 and 13).
Capital taxation, as we saw, is benecial when the average insurance eect prevails over the
average distribution eect. When the lump sum rebate is equal for all types, the tax has also a
redistributive element, since wealthier consumers tend to have a higher income from capital. Hence
the tax on capital eectively creates an income transfer from wealthier to poorer consumers, which
is benecial from the point of view of ex ante welfare.
We showed in Proposition 13 that taxing labor is benecial when the tax rebate has an insurance
eect. But when the rebate is equal for all types, and hence has an additional redistributive eect,
14This is only the direct eect of the change in L;K. For the same argument as in the previous section the price
eect, when evaluated at (L;K) = (0;0) is zero.
21this eect works in the opposite direction since richer consumers tend to work less than poorer ones,
and so the equal rebate eectively transfers income from the poor to the rich. It then follows that,
if the distribution eect
P
i DL
i is large enough, labor should rather be subsidized.
4.4 Taxing capital or labor?
In the previous analysis the eect of the tax on a factor's income was combined with the eect of
the lump sum rebate. The latter played an important role in the results, rst because it allowed
us to isolate the substitution eect of the tax and in the subsequent Sections 4.2, 4.3 because it
generated additional eects, via the insurance and redistributional role of the rebate. The following
natural question then arises: if the government cannot generate such lump sum transfers, should
we tax capital or rather labor? The budget balance condition, in the absence of lump sum rebates,
becomes:
wLL + rKK = 0: (41)
Therefore the two tax rates can no longer be independently set: if K is positive L has to be negative
at the level needed to satisfy (41). The objective function of the optimal taxation problem in this
case is directly obtained from the function WIR (:) considered in the previous section, simply by
setting L =  K
rK





. Its derivative with respect to K is then
@W
IR
@K   ^ r ^ K
^ w^ L  @W
IR


















































































Notice that the sum in the above expression is identical to the one appearing in (19) and has





@K =^ r + @w
@L= ^ w   1

; turns out to be the eect of a marginal increase of the tax on capital
























^ r ^ K
^ w^ L
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where the second equality follows from the Euler equation and the prot maximization conditions,
which imply: @r




One of the conditions stated in the natural sign assumption ((30) and (31)) says that, when the
tax revenue for each individual is rebated with a lump sum transfer, the net revenue from the sale of




@K =^ r + @w
@L= ^ w   1

< 0
says the same property holds for the tax on capital in the present framework, where the revenue
from such tax is rebated by a suitably dened subsidy on the sales of labor. The eect of such
subsidy is shown by the second term appearing on the right hand side of (43), which has a positive
15In particular, from the last expressions in (39) and (40).
22sign under (31). The condition that @r
@K =^ r + @w
@L= ^ w   1 < 0 is then a little stronger than (30), and
holds if factor prices are not too sensitive to the introduction of marginal taxes.
The previous discussion establishes the following result:






=0 < 0. If no lump sum transfer is allowed,
capital should be taxed if and only if there is under investment.
This result is somewhat surprising as the sign of the optimal tax on capital is exactly the opposite
of what we found in Proposition 12 and, partly, also in Proposition 13. So when we are in the
benchmark case, where there is no productivity shock for the investment in capital, and I = 1,
capital should be subsidized even though we know there is over investment.
To gain some intuition for this result, recall rst our previous nding that, when the only eect of
taxes is the substitution eect of the price change, it is optimal to tax capital and to subsidize labor
if and only if there is over investment. In the present environment, the tax scheme has no insurance
or redistribution component, since there are no lump sum rebates, but the induced price change has




@K =^ r + @w
@L= ^ w   1

< 0 says that the overall welfare eect
is primarily determined by the income eect of the induced price change, which prevails over the
substitution eect.
5 Numerical Example
In this section we consider a simple numerical example for which we derive the level of the optimal
capital and labor tax rates for the dierent types of tax transfer schemes investigated in the previous
section. In this framework we will also illustrate the ndings of the local analysis carried out in the
previous section, and compare them to the globally optimal tax rates. In principle, there is little
reason to believe that the local information around the competitive equilibrium is sucient to
identify the properties of the optimal tax rates in the general set up we considered. But it will be
seen that, under the functional forms and the specication of parameters which are commonly used
in the literature, the results of the local analysis turn out to be useful to infer the properties of the
global maximum.
There are two types of consumers and so I = 2. Consumers have the same preferences and
second period endowments, as well as the same distribution of the idiosyncratic shock, they only
dier for their initial endowments. We set e1 > e2 without loss of generality. So type 1 consumers
are richer than type 2 consumers and we shall refer to the rst ones as rich and the second ones


























where c0 is consumption in the rst period, and c and h are consumption and labor supply in the
second period in state . There is no shock to the productivity of investments in capital, as in the
benchmark case, and the shock to the productivity of labor is the identity map:
K
i () = 1; and L
i () =  for all  2 
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas:
F(K;L) = AKL1 :
23The values of the parameters are set as follows:  = 3, ' = 1, B = 8,  = 2:5, A = 1,  = 0:36.
We also x the average value of the labor productivity shocks,  , at unity, and the average initial
endowment,  e = (e1 + e2)=2, at 3.7162,16 while allowing for dierent values for the magnitude of
the shocks, identied by H, and the degree of heterogeneity, identied by e1= e. Note that under
all parameter congurations considered, our example yields a standard equilibrium, and the sign
conditions assumed in Propositions 12, 13, 14, and 15 are satised.
To start with, Figure 1 shows how market incompleteness aects capital accumulation and labor
supply. There we x the endowment distribution at e1= e = 1:42 and e2= e = 0:58, which implies
a standard deviation of about 60 percent. Then we let H vary from 1 to 1:4 with L = 2   H.
Thus the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock  changes from zero to about 57 percent.
The solid lines in the two panels of Figure 1 portray, respectively, the aggregate capital stock and
the aggregate labor supply at the competitive equilibrium of the economy for the dierent values of
the standard deviation of . The dotted lines in the same panels depict also the aggregate capital
and labor supply but at a competitive equilibrium where agents can trade in a complete market
for contingent claims. We see that aggregate capital is greater with incomplete asset markets than
with complete markets (due to the precautionary saving motive exhibited by the utility function
considered). On the other hand, aggregate labor supply is lower, due to the income eect caused by
the higher aggregate stock of capital. Moreover, the dierence between the values with incomplete
and complete markets is larger when the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is also larger,
that is, the uninsurable shock is more signicant.
In the subsequent gures we x the values of the idiosyncratic shocks at H = 1:2 and L = 0:8,
and let the standard deviation of the distribution of the initial endowments, ei= e, vary from zero
to 45 percent. Figure 2 plots the values of @W=@K and @W=@L evaluated at K = L = 0, that
is, the marginal eects on ex ante welfare of introducing taxation on capital and labor income at
the competitive equilibrium, as in the local analysis carried out in the previous section. Figure 3
plots the optimal tax rates, that is, the tax rates that maximize ex ante welfare W(K;L). In both
gures, we examine alternative specications of the lump-sum transfers as considered in the previous
section.
In each of the two gures the north-west panel corresponds to the tax scheme with no redistri-
bution nor insurance discussed in Section 4.1 (see equation (24)). Under this tax scheme, as shown
in Proposition 12, taxing capital or subsidizing labor is welfare enhancing (marginally at the com-
petitive equilibrium), when the average distribution eect is relatively small. In the example here,
the average distribution eect increases as the inequality in the initial endowments rises. This can
be seen in the north-west panel of Figure 2: @W=@K > 0 and @W=@L < 0 when the inequality in
initial distribution is suciently small, and vice versa when it is large. This local result is in accord
with the values obtained for the optimal tax rates, displayed in the north-west panel of Figure 3.
When the standard deviation of income distribution is close to zero the optimal tax rate on capital
is around 2 percent. The optimal tax rate then decreases monotonically as inequality increases,
becomes negative at the same point found in Figure 2 and equals approximately -3 percent when the
standard deviation of income distribution is 45 percent. The reverse properties hold for the optimal
tax on labor (whose level, in absolute value, is a bit lower).
The second tax scheme we consider is the one with insurance but no redistribution examined in
Section 4.2 (see equation (32)). The north-east panel of Figure 2 plots again the marginal eects of
16The values of ;'; are in line with those commonly used in the macroeconomics literature. The value of  e has
been chosen so that, when the consumers are identical and there are no shocks, e1 = e2 and H = L, the equilibrium
level of consumption is the same in the two periods, as in the steady state of a dynamic economy.
24capital and labor taxes, illustrating the claim in Proposition 13. The sign of the marginal eect on
ex ante welfare of capital taxation at the competitive equilibrium is the same as in the previous tax
scheme.17 This is in accord with this proposition, since in our example there is no idiosyncratic shock
to the return on capital. Also, the marginal eect of labor taxation is now positive regardless of the
degree of inequality in the initial endowment distribution. The north-east panel of Figure 3 shows
how the optimal tax rates vary with the inequality in the initial endowment. With no inequality
the optimal tax rates on capital and labor are both positive, equal respectively to around 6 and
10 percent. As the degree of inequality increases, the optimal tax rate on capital decreases. Note
however that it stays positive even when the marginal eect of capital taxation at an equilibrium
with no taxes becomes negative. This is the region where the suggestions provided by the local
analysis turns out to be misleading for the globally optimal tax rates, but the size of the region
appears to be small. The optimal tax rate on labor is positive and increases with the degree of
inequality, in accord with what suggested by the local analysis, reaching a level of around 12 percent
when the standard deviation of the endowment distribution is 45 percent.
The third tax scheme we consider is the one with insurance as well as redistribution, discussed
in Section 4.3 (see equation (36)). The south-west panel of Figure 2 plots the marginal eects of
taxation for this case, which illustrate the claim in Proposition 14. The marginal welfare eect of
capital taxation turns out to be always positive and, in contrast with the previous cases, to increase
with the degree of initial inequality as we see in Figure 2. So in this case, in the economy considered
in this example capital should be taxed even when there is under investment. We see in Figure
2 that the eect of labor taxation is also positive but falls as the degree of inequality increases,
reecting the fact that the distribution eect works against taxing labor. The south-west panel of
Figure 3 shows that the optimal capital and labor tax rates are again in line with what the local
analysis suggests: the optimal tax rate on capital income is positive and increases with the degree
of inequality, reaching a level of around 35 percent when the standard deviation of income is the
highest considered. The optimal tax rate on labor income is also positive though considerably lower
and declines slightly with the degree of inequality. As argued in Section 4.3, the nature of the tax
rebate in this case strengthens the case for taxing capital.
The last tax scheme we consider is the one without lump-sum transfers, analyzed in Section 4.4
(equation (41)). The south-east panel of Figure 2 plots the marginal eects of taxation for this case.
By construction, the tax rates on capital and labor income move in opposite directions to balance
the government's budget. By comparing the south-east with the north-east panels we see that under
this tax scheme the sign of the marginal eect of capital taxation is exactly the opposite to the one
found for the tax schemes without insurance nor redistribution analyzed in Section 4.1, in accord
with what shown in Proposition 15. Thus the marginal eect of capital taxation on ex ante welfare
is negative with no inequality in the initial endowment, but increases as inequality rises and becomes
positive for a suciently large degree of inequality. In the south-east panel of Figure 3 we conrm
that the optimal tax rates on capital and labor behave as our local analysis suggests: the optimal
tax on capital ranges from -10 to 10 percent as the standard deviation of income distribution varies
from 0 to 45 percent.
6 Concluding remarks
Our results demonstrate that the optimal tax rate on capital may be negative. Moreover this nding
applies for equilibria exhibiting standard properties and hence does not rely on any pathological
17The values are dierent since the derivatives of equilibrium price functions are dierent.
25properties, as the existence of upward sloping demand curves. In these cases, by subsidizing capital
and taxing labor the level of capital accumulation increases beyond the already "excessively high"
level of the equilibrium with no taxes.
As we have pointed out, the determination of the optimal taxation level is a second best problem,
constrained by the fact that the attainable allocations are those obtained as competitive equilibria
for a suitably designed tax system. Hence a simple comparison to the "ecient level" of capital
in the complete market equilibrium does not provide a right intuition for whether or not capital is
excessive.
In the environment considered competitive equilibria are generally Pareto inecient. The usual
textbook argument suggests that the ineciency can be decomposed into two parts: the allocational
ineciency and the production ineciency. The latter is caused by over/under use of capital/labor
in our model. If the capital/labor ratio is above the ecient, complete market level a positive tax
on capital should move this ratio towards its ecient level, thus generating an economic surplus.
This would make the agents better o if the surplus is distributed among the agents appropriately.
This line of argument, while correct in a partial equilibrium analysis, is insucient in a general
equilibrium environment with incomplete markets for at least two reasons. First, it ignores the fact
that the introduction of taxes may modify equilibrium prices and, with incomplete markets, the
level of equilibrium prices aects the consumers' ability to hedge the risk they face. Hence taxes, by
modifying such prices, may improve this ability, i.e., the allocational eciency may be improved at
the expense of production eciency. It is indeed the insurance eect in our analysis what captures
this intuition.
Secondly, the surplus can only be distributed via taxes and lump sum rebates as well as price
changes, so an appropriate distribution of the surplus may not be feasible. Taxes inevitably induce
some income redistribution, indirectly through price changes and directly through the distribution
of the tax revenue. Such distribution eects, as we saw in our analysis, will be dierent and have
opposite signs for agents with suciently dierent income levels and preferences. That is, the
taxation scheme we consider is not a perfect instrument to distribute the economic surplus from the
increase in production eciency among the dierent agents.
Furthermore, the social welfare criterion we consider ('under the veil of ignorance') favors equality
in income. Hence social welfare may be improved by increasing income equality while sacricing
production eciency, and this is true even when markets are complete.
The answer to the question of what is the optimal taxation level with incomplete markets is a
delicate one, and one cannot deduce it from the partial equilibrium intuition. It is our contribution
to identify the insurance and distribution eects of the tax and the determinants of the sign and
magnitude of these eects. This in turn provides useful information about the sign and magnitude
of the optimal tax on capital and labor, in a general equilibrium setting.
Finally, we readily acknowledge that while we are able to decompose and identify the eects of
taxes in a clear manner, the consideration of a two period environment when examining taxes on
capital is a limitation. In a companion paper (Gottardi, Kajii and Nakajima (2011)) we examine an
innite horizon environment: assuming that agents are identical ex ante, the income distribution at
a particular time period is then the result of past realizations of the uncertainty. We nd that the
main intuitions developed in this simple two period setup go through and allow to better understand
the properties of optimal taxes also in these dynamic economies.
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Appendix
Proofs for Lemmas 1 and 2. Consider the second-period utility maximization problem for a type






i (i)l = rK
i (i)ki + wL
i (i)  Hi;
27where ki has already been chosen in the rst period. This problem can be restated as a standard




subject to c + pl = m + p  H;
where p = wL
i (i) and m = rK
i (i)ki are taken as given. Writing c(p;m) and l(p;m) for the derived
demand functions for the consumption good and leisure respectively, and denoting by (p;m) the
Lagrange multiplier, the following rst-order conditions characterize the demand functions:
uc(c(p;m);l(p;m))   (p;m) = 0;
ul(c(p;m);l(p;m))   (p;m)p = 0;
 (c(p;m) + pl(p;m)) =  
 





i are comonotonic, and so are both p and m. Therefore, to establish Lemma
1, it suces to show that (p;m) is decreasing in m and p. Since (p;m) is the derivative of the
indirect utility function with respect to income and the indirect utility function is concave in income
for a concave utility, it readily follows that  is decreasing in m.
We shall now show that (p;m) is decreasing in p as well. To simplify the notation, we shall
omit reference to (p;m) below. To nd the derivatives of  (as well as those for c and l), we follow































The strict concavity assumption implies that the determinant of the square matrix above is positive:
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;
which is negative. Indeed, using the rst order condition, (uccp   ucl) = uccul   ucluc < 0 where





> 0 by concavity
and
 
l    H

< 0. Therefore, Lemma 1 has been established.
Notice that the labor supply in eciency units corresponds to
   H   l

p=w in the consumer
problem above, so in order to establish Lemma 2 it suces to show that
   H   l

p is increasing in
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where the last inequality follows from the normality of leisure. This proves Lemma 2.








Capital stock with complete and incomplete markets
 
 















Figure 1: Capital stock and labor supply with complete and incomplete markets. The



























































Figure 2: Marginal eects on ex ante welfare of taxation on capital and labor under alter-
native specications of the lump sum rebates. The horizontal axis measures the standard






























































Figure 3: Optimal tax rates on capital and labor under alternative specications of the lump
sum rebates. The horizontal axis measures the standard deviation of the initial endowment
distribution (percent).